Repay and add collateral remain open through all of the above, and through guardian pause.
Not insured. Not a brokerage account. Not a claim that audits are done. Pre-audit as of this build.
Related: Oracle, Liquidations, Security.
Risks
Single issuer, weekend gaps, and thin exit depth.
The protocol assumes the collateral is a stock token, with everything that implies.
These constraints stay even when every invariant holds.
Every current book is a claim on Robinhood-issued stock tokens. One issuer cap covers all twelve listings. A failure at the issuer is not a per-book event. Caps bound draw. They do not diversify the issuer.
Feeds print 24/5. DARK serves last close minus 200 bps, and blocks borrow and withdraw. LT and reserve are sized for a two-day gap beyond that haircut. A Monday gap larger than that model still lands on suppliers after the bad-debt waterfall.
Onchain liquidity for stock tokens is thin. Liquidators hedge offchain. The registry allowlist flag is on at launch, but the module does not enforce it. Caps and the Dutch auction are the live controls.